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Abstract
This paper oﬀers a refinement and explores a resolution of the excess-
returns puzzle in the foreign exchange market. We find that the predictions of
the forward premium are not negatively biased throughout the three decades
of floating, as commonly believed, but rather are sometimes positively biased,
negatively biased, unbiased or possess no predictive content depending on the
subperiod examined. To explain this modified puzzle, the paper makes use
of a recently developed model of the risk premium, which we have called an
aggregate uncertainty premium. Our model employs an alternative approach
to modeling exchange rate expectations, dubbed Imperfect Knowledge Expec-
tations (IKE), which recognizes that rational agents do form expectations
based on imperfect knowledge. Our model also makes use of a dynamic exten-
sion of the assumption of myopic loss aversion. We find that our IKE-based
approach can account for the pattern of positive and negative biases esti-
mated over three decades of floating rates.
1 Introduction
The ubiquitous use of theRational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) testifies to
the widespread belief among economists that the REH provides the solution
to the perennial problem of modeling the expectations of rational agents. Yet
it is precisely in those settings in which agents’ expectations play a central
role, such as asset markets, that REH-based models encounter their greatest
diﬃculty. In the foreign exchange market, Dornbusch pointed out as early as
1983 that his seminal overshooting model does not explain the observed long
swings in exchange rates (Dornbusch (1983)).1 Ever since, macroeconomists
using the REH have grappled with this and other anomalous features of
exchange rate movements over the modern floating-rate period.
This paper examines one of the core puzzles in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, the excess-returns puzzle (also referred to as the forward-premium anom-
aly). The puzzle stems from a widely reported finding that the estimate of
the slope coeﬃcient in a regression of the future change in the spot rate
on the forward premium (to be referred to as the Bilson (1981) and Fama
(1984) (BF) regression) is significantly negative. Froot and Thaler (1990)
report that the average estimate of this slope coeﬃcient is −0.88 in over 75
published articles, indicating that the forward premium is a biased predictor
of the future change in the spot rate. As Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1989, p.589)
put it “if taken literally, the finding that [the slope] is negative, and often
significantly so, is startling. It suggests that one can make predictable profits
by betting against the forward rate.”
The literature has noted two explanations for this negative bias: either
the forward premium is correlated with agents’ forecast errors and/or it is
correlated with a risk premium. Because the former explanation suggests
the “irrationality” of expectations (see Froot and Frankel (1989)), it has
been largely resisted by the literature. However, despite volumes of research,
empirical attempts to explain the negative bias of forward rates as the equi-
librium compensation for risk under the Rational Expectations Hypothesis
1Dornbusch and Frankel surmised that the source of the problem may be the use of
the REH. As they put it “The chief problem with the overshooting theory, and indeed
with the more general rational expectations approach, is that it does not explain well the
shorter-term [long-swings] dynamics (Dornbusch and Frankel, 1988, p. 16).” Excessive
fluctuations in other asset markets have also been documented. For an early seminal
treatment of such stock price dynamics see Shiller (1981).
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(REH) have not succeeded on the whole.2 Given the universal acceptance of
the REH as the model of rational expectations formation, the literature has
not looked for explanations of a negative bias in models of risk premia that
do not employ the REH.
This paper oﬀers a refinement and explores a resolution of the excess-
returns puzzle. Our refinement is based on an examination of the temporal
stability of the BF regression over the modern floating-rate period, using US
dollar rates with respect to the British pound (BP), German mark (DM) and
Japanese yen (JY). We find this regression to be considerably more unstable
than hitherto believed.3 Our structural change findings include: 1) numerous
structural breaks throughout the sample; 2) a significantly negative estimate
of the slope coeﬃcient for all three currencies when estimated over the 1980’s
(despite numerous break points in that decade); and 3) substantial subpe-
riods within the 1970’s and 1990’s during which the estimate of the slope
coeﬃcient is either significantly greater than one, significantly negative, in-
significantly diﬀerent from one (and zero) and significantly diﬀerent from
one but not zero. Hence, we find that the excess-returns puzzle is not as
simple as suggested by the extant literature. What needs to be explained
is not a negative bias throughout the three decades of floating, but rather
why the predictions of the forward premium are sometimes negatively biased,
positively biased, unbiased or possess no predictive content depending on the
subperiod examined. If the explanation of thismodified excess-returns puzzle
involves a time-varying risk premium, then any model of such a phenomenon
that purports to explain the negative bias in the 1980’s must also be consis-
tent with the observed temporal instability and the positive biases found in
other subperiods.
We explore a resolution of the excess-returns puzzle, as modified in this
paper, that is partly based on a new model of the aggregate risk premium
due to Frydman and Goldberg (2001,2002,2003a). Our model of the risk
premium employs an alternative approach to modeling exchange rate expec-
tations, dubbed Imperfect Knowledge Expectations (IKE).4 It also makes use
2See Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996) for review articles. One of the most troubling
aspects of the empirical record for risk-premium models under the REH are the frequent
sign reversals observed in excess returns. See Mark and Wu (1998).
3Bekaert and Hodrick (1993), Lewis (1995) and Mark and Wu (1998) report subsample
estimates for the 1970’s and 1980’s and find that the negative slope coeﬃcient is mainly
due to behavior from 1980’s.
4The IKE approach is developed in Frydman and Goldberg (2002). It builds on the
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of a dynamic extension of myopic loss aversion, developed in Frydman and
Goldberg (2001,2002) and based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Be-
nartzi and Thaler (1995). Our attempt to model the risk premium under
IKE, which we call an uncertainty premium, has been motivated not only
by the inability of risk-premium models under the REH to account for the
facts, but also by the diverse set of arguments that have been developed for
over two decades suggesting that the REH is very unlikely to characterize,
even in a highly abstract and stylized manner, expectations formed by ratio-
nal agents.5 As Sargent has reminded us quite recently, rather than being a
model of individual expectations,
rational expectations is an equilibrium concept that at best describes how
the system might eventually behave if the system will ever settle down to a
situation in which all of the agents have solved their “scientific problems”
(emphasis added, Sargent (1993), p. 23).
The IKE framework recognizes the importance of imperfect knowledge
and yet preserves the postulate of individual rationality. As with conven-
tional economic analysis, it supposes that economic agents do not ignore
exploitable profit opportunities. We show in this paper that in a world of
imperfect knowledge this basic rationality assumption leads to an explana-
tion of one of the primary aspects of the modified excess-returns puzzle: the
temporal instability of the BF regression. In particular, the rationality of
agents implies temporal instability of aggregate forecast functions, which in
turn, leads to instability in the relationship between the aggregate uncer-
tainty premium and the forward premium and, therefore, to instability of
the slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression.6
idea of Theories Consistent Expectations (TCE), proposed in Frydman and Phelps [1990]
and developed in Goldberg [1991] and Goldberg and Frydman [1993,1996a], according to
which the extant stock of economic models provides agents with qualitative knowledge
that can be used in forming individual expectations.
5For recent critical analyses of the epistemological and behavioral foundations of the
REH and misconceptions concerning the connection between the REH and individual
rationality, see Sargent [1993], Kurz and Motolese [1999], Evans and Honkapohja [2001],
Frydman and Goldberg [2002] and references therein. For an early discussion of the main
problems with the REH, see Frydman [1982], Frydman and Phelps [1983] and Frydman
[1983].
6As we show in Frydman and Goldberg (2002), our approach to updating of expecta-
tions is very diﬀerent from the so-called "rational learning" models, which we have argued
is in general inconsistent with individual rationality in a world of imperfect knowledge.
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The IKE-based model of the uncertainty premium also serves as a key
ingredient in our explanation of the other important feature of the modi-
fied excess-returns puzzle: the pattern of positive and negative estimates of
the slope coeﬃcient over three decades of floating rates. This explanation
involves three components. First, under IKE and some fairly general as-
sumptions concerning the updating of individual forecast functions, otherwise
standard exchange rate models generate long swings — time periods during
which the exchange rate moves persistently away from long-run benchmark
levels (such as purchasing power parity (PPP)), followed by time periods
involving persistent countermovements back.7 Second, our dynamic model
of myopic loss aversion implies that the absolute value of the uncertainty
premium on the overvalued currency will rise (fall) persistently during sub-
periods characterized by a persistent swing in the exchange rate away from
(back to) the long-run benchmark level. Third, with IKE, models of the
exchange rate imply no permanently stable relationship between swings in
the exchange rate and movements of the forward premium, and thus of the
diﬀerential in nominal interest rates, (see Goldberg and Frydman (1996a)
and Frydman and Goldberg (2002)).
To see how this works, consider the most pronounced swing in the DM/$
rate away from PPP during the 1980’s, which occurred from the middle of
1981 until the beginning of 1985. Our IKE-based model of the uncertainty
premium predicts that the excess return on the U.S. dollar relative to the
German mark should be positive and trending up during this exchange rate
swing. Since the forward premium happened to be trending down from the
end of 1982 until the middle of 1984, we would expect a negative correlation
between the uncertainty premium and forward premium during this period.
But this implies that the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression
should be significantly less than one from the end of 1982 until the middle of
1984. We find that this prediction is consistent with the empirical record: the
ex post excess return on the dollar was indeed trending up during the 1981-85
period and, despite a small sample, the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient during
the 1982-84 subperiod is significantly negative (-19.8!). We also examine the
most pronounced exchange rate swing away for the other currencies in the
1980’s, as well as the major swing away for each currency during the 1970’s
7In Frydman and Goldberg [2002] we use IKE to close the monetary model of the
exchange rate and show that, contrary to the usual presumption, long swings can occur
even if individual forecast functions are solely a function of macroeconomic fundamentals.
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and 1990’s. We find that the three components of our IKE-based explanation
can account for the negative biases observed during the swings away in the
1980’s for the BP and JY and the positive biases observed for each of the
swings in the 1970’s and 1990’s for all three currencies.8
There have been attempts in the literature to explain the excess-returns
puzzle (confined to explaining a negative bias) as the consequence of a peso
problem arising from the long-swings nature of exchange rate movements.
These studies have modeled the structural change and long swings using
the Hamilton (1988,1989) Markov switching model.9 Although we find that
swings in the exchange rate and structural change play an important role
in explaining the modified excess returns puzzle, we present evidence in this
paper that the role of such swings and structural change is quite diﬀerent
than what is implied by these REH-based studies.
A key question, which we leave open in this paper, is the contribution
of a time-varying uncertainty premium relative to systematic forecast errors
in explaining the modified excess-returns puzzle. As we emphasize in Fryd-
man and Goldberg (2003b), with imperfect knowledge, correlations between
aggregate forecast errors and publicly available information, such as the for-
ward premium, will appear from time to time. However, such correlations
should not be interpreted, necessarily, as evidence that agents’ forecasts are
irrational. This is because as rational agents cope with imperfect knowledge
and attempt to exploit information in their forecast errors, such correlations
experience temporal instability and disappear at unpredictable moments of
time.10 Using survey data on exchange rate expectations, we examine the
stability of the correlation between forecast errors and the forward premium
in Frydman and Goldberg (2003b) and explore the relative contributions of
the uncertainty premium and forecast errors in explaining the excess-returns
puzzle.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we show
8Although our IKE model implies that there will also be an uncertainty premium during
subperiods involving no apparent swings in the exchange rate, the absence of such swings
will be, in general, associated with frequent structural shifts in the relationship between
the uncertainty premium and the forward premium. This suggests that such subperiods
of no swings will result in an insignificant estimate of the slope coeﬃcient in the BF
regression, even if the forward premium is trending.
9See, Engel and Hamilton (1990), Baekert and Hodrick (1993), Kaminsky (1993), and
Evans and Lewis (1995).
10For a formal analysis of this point see Frydman (1982).
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that with rational agents and imperfect knowledge, the relationship between
the aggregate risk premium and the forward premium, and therefore the
slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression, will be temporally unstable. This
motivates the structural change analysis presented in section 3, which leads
to the refinement of the excess-returns puzzle. In section 4 we explore the
potential of the REH approach to model structural change and to explain
the pattern of positive and negative slope coeﬃcients in the BF regression
documented in section 3. Section 5 outlines our IKE-based model of the
uncertainty premium and shows how it can be used in explaining the excess-
returns puzzle, as modified in section 3. Finally, section 6 contains concluding
remarks.
2 Imperfect Knowledge, Structural Change
and the BF Regression
In this section we first reproduce the standard finding of a negative estimate
of the slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression when the entire sample period
is used. As a way to motivate the structural change analysis of the next
section, we then examine the channels through which structural change can
arise in the BF regression. We show that temporal instability in the aggre-
gate expectation function, which is implied by our IKE framework, directly
implies temporal instability in the relationship between the aggregate risk
premium and the forward premium, leading to temporal instability of the
slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression.
The BF regression is based on the following equation:
∆st+1 = α+ βfpt + υt (1)
where ∆st+1 denote the one-period ahead change in the exchange rate, de-
fined as the number of units of foreign currency per US dollar and fpt is the
forward premium, defined as the diﬀerence between the one-period foreign
and US interest rates. If market agents are risk neutral and their forecast
errors are uncorrelated with the forward premium, then equilibrium in the
foreign exchange market implies that α = 0 and β = 1. Since the objective
of studies based on (1) is to examine the unbiasedness of forward-premium
predictions and since the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient may be influenced
by the presence of an intercept term in the regression, we estimate (1) with
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and without α. To save space we report our results in the following manner:
if the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient based on (1) is significantly diﬀerent
than one, then we report estimates of both α and β; if the estimate of the
slope based on (1) is insignificantly diﬀerent from one, but an estimate of the
slope based on the regression without the intercept is significantly diﬀerent
from one, we report this estimate of β; otherwise, we report estimates based
on the BF regression both with and without the intercept.
Table 1 reports our estimates of the BF regression, which are based on
data from DRI on U.S. dollar spot and one-month forward rates with respect
to the British pound (BP), German mark (DM) and Japanese yen (JY). Our
sample runs from May 1973 (1973:5) through December 1996 (1996:12).11
The results in Table 1 are consistent with those found in the literature.12
When the entire sample is used, the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient (βˆ) is
negative for both the BP and DM and significantly less than one. As for the
JY, βˆ is positive and insignificantly diﬀerent from one or zero over the full
sample. But if the regression begins in 1975:01, which is common (see Fama
(1984) and others), then βˆ becomes significantly negative.
Although the literature has noted that the departure of β from the null
of one can be attributed to a correlation of the forward premium with either
the market (aggregate) forecast error and/or the risk premium, the main
sources of the temporal instability of β have been largely ignored. There are
two main channels through which temporal instability can arise in the BF
regression: either the aggregate expectation function is temporally unstable
or the correlation between the forward premium and the market forecast
error is temporally unstable. The instability of the aggregate expectation
function, in turn, implies that the correlation between the forward premium
and the risk premium will also be temporally unstable.13
To present this more formally, define the risk premium, pr, and the market
forecast error, η, at time t as follows:
prt = ∆set+1 − fpt (2)
and
11Note that the ending observation in 1996:12 includes the one-period change in the
exchange rate from 1996:12 to 1997:01.
12For extensive surveys of the literature see Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996).
13Temporal instability of β can also arise from non-stationarity of the fp process. Mark,
Wu and Hai (1993) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1994) find that fp is very persistent, but
probably stationary.
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ηt = ∆st+1 −∆set+1 (3)
where ∆set+1 denotes the one-period ahead aggregate (market) forecast of the
change in the exchange rate. Using (2) and (3), we can write the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimate of β in (1) as follows:
βˆt,Tj =
dCovt,Tj(4s, fp)dV art,Tj(fp) = 1 +
dCovt,Tj(pr, fp)dV art,Tj(fp) +
dCovt,Tj(η, fp)dV art(fp) (4)
where dCovt,Tj(., .) and dV art,Tj(., .) denote sample covariances and variances,
respectively, computed for a specific sample of size Tj spanning the period
of time from t through t+ Tj − 1.14 It is typical in the literature to assume
that the OLS estimator, βˆt,Tj ,is consistent, so that the sample estimates in
equation (4) can be replaced with time-invariant probability limits. Thus we
define:
β = p lim (βˆt,Tj) (5)
As we discuss in Frydman and Goldberg (2002), with imperfect knowl-
edge, rational agents recognize that their models and rules are not strictly
correct (i.e., that they “have not solved their scientific problems”) and con-
sequently behave like scientists, namely, they test their models and rules
against available data and in the face of contradictory evidence revise their
trading strategies. This notion of rationality applies no matter what ob-
jective functions market players possess, whether these are standard utility
functions or those based on behavioral considerations: whatever the objec-
tive function, rational agents will be testing and updating their expectations
functions because they recognize they do not possess the true model. To
the extent that agents’ forecast functions include fp or variables correlated
with fp, this updating implies that the plim (dCovt,Tj(∆se, fp)) is temporally
unstable.15
14If the BF regression does not include the constant term, the covariance and variance
terms in (4) are replaced by appropriate moments.
15In Goldberg and Frydman (1996a) we present evidence based on survey data that the
relationship between exchange rate expectations and macroeconomic fundamentals is in-
deed temporally unstable in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Unsurprsingly, we find in Goldberg and
Frydman (1996b,2001) that empirical exchange rate models are also temporally unstable
over the modern period of floating.
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This in turn implies that the p lim(dCovt,Tj(pr, fp)) is also temporally un-
stable. To see this, note from (2) that
dCovt,Tj(pr, fp)dV art,Tj(fp) =
dCovt,Tj(∆se, fp)dV art(fp) − 1 (6)
Furthermore, with IKE, relatively stable correlations between aggregate
forecast errors and publicly available information (e.g., fp) may appear from
time to time. But rational agents will attempt to exploit such correlations
and, in the process, update and revise their trading strategies. Individ-
ual rationality implies, therefore, that even if forecast errors were to to be
correlated with the forward premium during select subperiods, such corre-
lations will arise sporadically, experience temporal instability and disappear
at unpredictable moments of time. Thus, individual rationality and imper-
fect knowledge imply that the plim (dCovt,Tj(η, fp)) may also be temporally
unstable, further exacerbating the instability of β in (4).
Beyond clarifying the sources of the temporal instability of β, (4) also
makes clear (as noted by Froot and Frankel (1989) and others) the two sources
of departure of β from 1: nonzero correlations between the forward premium
and the risk premium and/or forecast errors. We close this section with two
observations. First, beyond the diﬃculties with modeling pr under the REH
that have been pointed out in the literature (see footnote 2), the finding of
temporal instability of β in the BF regression implies that any REH-based
model of pr would have to be consistent with temporal instability of the
correlation between the risk premium and the forward premium. Second,
we note that under IKE, models of the exchange rate imply no permanently
stable relationship between exchange rate expectations and the forward pre-
mium (see Frydman and Goldberg (2002) and section 5.2 below). Moreover,
with IKE, the correlation between exchange rate expectations (and therefore
the risk premium) and the forward premium can switch between positive and
negative values from one subperiod to the next. In the next section we show
that instability of such a striking form is indeed an evident feature of the
modern period of floating rates. We explore in section 4 the implication of
this finding for the modeling of structural change under the REH, while in
section 5 we explore the potential of our IKE-based model of the uncertainty
premium to explain the observed switches in the value and sign of the slope
coeﬃcient in the BF regression. We leave for future research an examination
of the role of transient correlations between η and fp.
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3 Temporal Instability and a Refinement of
the Excess-Returns Puzzle
There are a number of studies that report subsample estimates of the BF
regression and find that the negative β appears to be the result of behavior
during the 1980’s (see footnote 3). Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) formally tests
for parameter constancy using a forecast Chow test and find a break at the
beginning of 1980 at the one-percent significance level. In this section we
find that the temporal instability of the BF regression is much more frequent
and striking than suggested by this study. Our structural change findings
not only lend support to our IKE framework, but they lead to a refinement
of the excess-returns puzzle.
We begin by looking at subsample results using a rough division of the
sample into three subperiods of floating, the 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s. These
results are reported in Table 2. Table 2 shows that the results of the BF
regression are sensitive to the sample period chosen. For all three currencies,
βˆ is positive and insignificantly diﬀerent from one and zero for the 1970’s
and, with the exception of the JY, for the 1990’s as well. During the 1980’s,
however, βˆ is negative and significantly so for all three currencies. These
results confirm those of Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) for the 1970’s and 1980’s
and, moreover, show that the negative β obtained when using the entire
sample also appears to have little to do with the behavior in the 1990’s.
They are also suggestive of structural change.
To test for structural change, we use the forecast χ2 test due to Hendry
(1979), which is analogous to the structural change test used in Bekaert and
Hodrick (1993). These results are reported in the last column of Table 2.
The results show that the null of parameter constancy can be rejected at high
significance levels when the 1970’s are used for the estimation period and the
1980’s used for the forecast period for all three currencies (the forecast period
is shown in parentheses in column 2 of the table). The results also show that
while the null of no break at 1990:01 can be rejected at a high significance
level for the DM, this is not the case for the BP and JY. However, as the
table reports, when the first and second half of the 1980’s are examined, the
null of parameter constancy can be rejected for all three currencies. Finally,
using the second half of the 1980’s as the estimation period, the null of no
break at 1990:01 is rejected at less than the five percent level for all three
currencies.
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Table 2 is based on crude divisions of the sample. As noted in the
preceding section, with IKE we would expect the temporal instability of
the BF regression to be more widespread than suggested by Table 2. To
test this conjecture we use the recursive, one-step ahead Chow test pro-
vided in Hendry and Doornik (1996). The test statistic is calculated as
follows: Chowt =
(RSSt−RSSt−1)(t−k−1)
RSSt/(t−k) , where RSSt denotes the residual sum
of squares for the model fitted up to and including period t, and k denotes
the number of variables (k = 1 in (1)). Under the null of no structural
change between periods t− 1 and t, this statistic has an F distribution with
1 and t− k degrees of freedom. Since the statistic and the critical values are
functions of t, it is useful to divide the Chowt value by its x% critical value
from the F table to yield a scaled recursive Chow test for each recursion.,
i.e., ChowtFx(1,t−k) , which under the null should be less than one. Thus, values of
this statistic greater than one imply that the null of no structural change
between t− 1 and t can be rejected at the x% level of significance.
Figures 1 through 3 report the results of this test using the five percent
significance level. The figures show numerous points of structural change for
all the three currencies throughout the 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s. These re-
sults indicate that the temporal instability of the Fama regression is pervasive
over the modern period of floating rates.16
As we mentioned in the introduction and outline in section 5.1 below, our
IKE-based model of the uncertainty premium also implies that there will be
a significant bias, either positive or negative, during subperiods character-
ized by two features: 1) a persistent swing in the exchange rate away from or
towards the long-run benchmark level (which according to our model leads
to a corresponding swing in the uncertainty premium); and 2) a trending
forward premium. This suggests that the places to look for significant bi-
ases in the forward premium, both positive and negative, as well as points
of structural change, are during subperiods characterized by exchange rate
swings. A complete empirical analysis of this conjecture would require some
definition of a swing in the exchange rate and a measure of the long-run
benchmark level used by market agents in assessing potential losses. Since
16To gauge the extent ot the temporal instability of the BF regression we also estimated
equation (1) for successive three-year subperiods, beginning in 1973:05 and rolling the
three-year window through the entire sample. The results of this analysis, which are
available from the authors upon request, show a similar picture to that presented in figures
1 through 3, namely the temporal instability of the BF regression for all three currencies
is pervasive over the modern period of floating.
11
the aim of this section is to provide evidence of instability involving both
positive and negative biases during swings ( leading to a modification of the
excess returns puzzle), we do not provide such a complete analysis of the
evolution of β over the entire floating-rate period. We leave this for future
research. In this paper we focus on the behavior of β during the most pro-
nounced swing away from PPP in each of the three decades of floating. In
this way we sidestep the diﬃculties of defining a swing and rigorously justi-
fying our measure of the long-run benchmark level, since by most accounts
the subperiods containing the most pronounced swings are widely viewed to
have involved large departures from long-run bench mark levels.
Consider first the DM/$ exchange rate, which is plotted in figure 4 along
with its PPP value.17 The figure shows that major swings in this rate away
from PPP occurred during the 1970’s (between 1975:11 and 1978:10), 1980’s
(between 1982:06 and 1985:02) and 1990’s (between 1993:09 and 1995:04).
Given our model of the uncertainty premium, these subperiods of floating
should involve a positive and growing excess return on the overvalued cur-
rency. If the forward premium also happens to be trending during these
subperiods then we would expect β to deviate from one. Figure 5 plots the
forward premium in each of the three subperiods during the 1970’s, 1980’s
and 1990’s. The figure shows that while the forward premium trends down
throughout the exchange rate swing in the 1990’s, this is not the case for
the large swings in the 1970’s and 1980’s. For the subperiods during the
1970’s and 1980’s, a downward trend in fp arises only after the beginning
of each of the exchange rate swings (1976:12 and 1982:11, respectively), and
in the 1980’s it abruptly changes direction before the exchange rate swing
ends (1984:06). Consequently, the second panel of table 3 provides estimates
of the BF regression based on subperiods in which the exchange rate swings
are associated with clear trends in the forward premium. Despite the small
sample sizes, the estimates of β are large in magnitude, significantly diﬀerent
from one in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and marginally so in the 1990’s. Strik-
ingly, while the swing away in the 1980’s is characterized by a negative bias,
the bias is positive during the swings away in the 1970’s and 1990’s.
A similar picture emerges when the subperiods of the most pronounced
exchange rate swings away are examined for the BP and JY. Figures 6 and 7
17We benchmark our PPP series using the April 1989 BigMac PPP exchange rates as
reported in the Economist magazine. We then use CPI inflation rates to derive the PPP
exchange rates for all other months.
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plot the BP and JY rates along with their PPP levels, respectively, whereas
figures 8 and 9 plot the forward premium during the subperiods involving the
most pronounced exchange rate swings away from PPP. The first and third
panels of table 3 provide estimates of the BF regression, again based on
those subperiods during which the exchange rate swings away from PPP are
associated with clear trends in the forward premium.18 The table does not
report BP estimates for the 1990’s because as figure 6 reveals, there were no
major swings away from PPP during this decade. The results show that the
pattern of biases for the BP and JY is similar to the pattern found for the DM.
For the BP, the first panel shows that estimates of β are large in magnitude,
significantly diﬀerent from one during both swings, and as strikingly as with
the DM, the bias during the 1970’s swing is positive, while the bias during
the 1980’s swing is negative. Finally, for the JY (the third panel) we find
that the estimates of β for the 1970’s and 1980’s are significantly diﬀerent
from one, with the former being positive and the latter negative, and the
estimate for the 1990’s, while significantly positive is insignificantly diﬀerent
from one.
Although some studies (e.g. Engel and Hamilton (1990), Bekaert and Ho-
drick (1993), Kaminsky (1993) and Evans and Lewis (1995)) have attempted
to explain a negative β as the consequence of long swings in the exchange
rate, the results in table 3 for all three currencies lead to the conclusion that
such long swings away can result in both positive (and greater than one) and
negative values of the slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression. In section 5.2
below we oﬀer an explanation of these results using our IKE-based model of
the uncertainty premium.
The last column of table 3 also presents additional evidence that the
temporal instability of the BF regression is pervasive and that it is connected
with the long-swings behavior of the exchange rate. The table shows that
there is a structural break at the end of every major swing at p-values of
less than .001. It should be noted that these results, together with those in
table 2 and in figures 1 through 3, are consistent with our earlier findings
that empirical exchange rate models experience numerous break points over
the modern period of floating (Goldberg and Frydman, 1996b,2001).
18The subperiods of exchange rate swings are 1975:02-1976:10 and 1982:06-1985:02 for
the BP and 1977:05-1978:10, 1981:05-1985:02 and 1990:04-1995:04 for the JY. The subpe-
riods involving both swings in the exchange rate and forward premium are 1975:06-1976:10
and 1983:03-1984:06 for the BP and 1977:05-1978:09, 1983:01-1984:06 and 1991:04-1995:04
for the JY.
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In addition to evidence of positive and negative β’s, the floating-rate
experience contains many episodes, particularly in the 1970’s and the 1990’s,
during which the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression is not
significantly diﬀerent from zero or one. Table 4 reports the results for the
other subperiods in the 1970’s and the 1990’s not examined in table 3. The
table shows that except for four cases, the estimates are not significantly
diﬀerent from either one or zero. Since the standard errors of the estimates
are relatively large, this evidence does not allow us to distinguish between
the case in which the forward premium is an unbiased predictor of the future
change in exchange rate and the other three cases examined in this paper, i.e.
a positive bias, a negative bias, and the case in which the forward premium
does not appear to be a predictor. Although our aim here is not to explain
the behavior in these subperiods, we note that most of them do not involve
persistent trends in both the exchange rate and the forward premium, and
thus our theory suggests that the uncertainty premium (and therefore excess
returns) would not be correlated with the forward premium. In contrast, the
four subperiods characterized by an estimate of the slope coeﬃcient that is
significantly diﬀerent from one in table 4 (1973:05-1975:05 and 1976:10-1979-
12 for the BP and 1978:11-1979:12 and 1995:05-1996:12 for the JY) do involve
trends in both the exchange rate and the forward premium for substantial
parts of these subperiods. We leave an examination of these subperiods for
future research.
Taken together, the results of this section provide evidence that the
excess-returns puzzle is more complicated than hitherto believed. What
needs to be explained is not a negative bias throughout the three decades of
floating, but rather why the predictions of the forward premium are some-
times negatively biased, positively biased, unbiased or possess no predictive
content, depending on the subperiod examined. Before we oﬀer our IKE-
based explanation of the excess-returns puzzle as modified in this paper, we
explore the potential of the REH approach to explain the structural change
documented in this section.
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4 Structural Change, the REH and the Mod-
ified Excess-Returns Puzzle
The foregoing structural-change findings suggest that models relating the
future change in the exchange rate to the forward premium are subperiod
specific, that is, the signs and values of the intercept and slope in the BF
regression seem to take on many diﬀerent values over the three decades of
floating. In this section we explore the question of whether such findings can
be reconciled with the REH.
According to the REH, agents form their expectations according to the
economist’s model. Having tied expectations rigidly to the structure of the
economist’s model, and presuming that the parameters of this structure are
functions of “deep”, largely invariant, parameters of “preferences” and “tech-
nology,” the RE approach implies that changes in government policy are the
primary source of instability of the parameters of macroeconometric models
(Lucas (1976)). By pointing out that changes in government policy influence
agents’ expectations and lead, therefore, to changes in the parameters of ag-
gregate macroeconomic models, the Lucas critique has profoundly altered our
view of the eﬀects of government policy on the macroeconomy. Although the
Lucas critique focussed on the usefulness of the older Keynesian models of
the neoclassical synthesis, what seems to have remained largely unnoticed is
that the structural instability implied by the Lucas critique also raises some
diﬃculties for the REH-based models. Under the REH, agents are aware that
government policy will change in the future (e.g., new Fed chairmen will be
appointed), implying that a full REH solution requires specification of all
future shifts in policy rules.19 One way to accomplish this is to assume that
the impact of all policy regimes (past and future) on the model structure
can be characterized by a finite number of quantitative sub-models and to
19This may help explain why, except for some particular and simple shifts in policy
variables (Wilson 1979), temporal instability arising from shifts in future policy rules has
not received much attention in the analysis of REH-based macroeconometric models. As
noted by Sargent in his study of the US inflation:
[Rational expectations econometrics] left the drift in coeﬃcients un-
explained...Yet coeﬃcients continue to drift for macroeconometric mod-
els...Thus, the forecasting literature has taken coeﬃcient drift increasingly
seriously, but with little help from the rational expectations tradition (Sar-
gent (1999), p.16).
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suppose that a stationary process governs the switches of structure between
these sub-models.20
Such a model of structural change that can be used in REH-based models
was developed by Hamilton (1988, 1989) and applied to a wide range of
problems, including the excess-returns puzzle in the foreign exchange market
(Engel and Hamilton (1990), Bekaert and Hodrick (1993), Kaminsky (1993),
and Evans and Lewis (1995)). In particular, Engel and Hamilton assume
that the change in the exchange rate at time t is a realization from one of the
two “regimes”, specified as random walks with diﬀerent values of the drift
coeﬃcient. The specific regime that the exchange rate is in at any given time
depends on the realization of an unobserved random variable characterized by
a stationary Markov chain. Under the REH, this model of structural change
presumes that the impact of past and future policy rules can be specified as
one overarching model of exchange rate movements, composed of two specific
sub-models and some stationary switching process between these sub-models.
This presumption is tantamount to the assumption that structural change
can be modeled as a stationary process, thereby allowing the REH to be used
to model agents’ expectations. As in standard settings, the REH assumes
that agents use the economist’s model, which now provides for a specific form
of structural change, that is agents form expectations on the basis of the true
values of the parameters of the two sub-models and the Markov transition
probabilities.21
Engel and Hamilton (1990) estimate the parameters of the two random-
walk models and transition probabilities for the DM/$, French franc and
20The so-called “rational” learning, which assumes that all agents use some learning
algorithm to learn about changes in policy, has also been used to model structural change
resulting from changes in government policy. We show in Frydman (1982) and exten-
sively discuss in Frydman and Goldberg (2002) that the assumption that agents adhere
to such rules during learning is, in general, incompatible with the postulate of individual
rationality.
21The assumption that agents’ knowledge of the parameters of the economist’s model is
superior to the economist himself is basic to the RE approach. As Sargent noted
Rational expectations equilibrium...typically imputes to the people more knowledge
about the system they are operating in than is available to the economists using the
model to try to understand their behavior (Sargent (1993, p.21)).
Moreover, we note that the REH is even more problematic here than in the simpler
settings, since agents are assumed to know the transition probabilities of the unobseved
process governing transitions between models and, as we shall discuss next, the estimated
number of transitions is very small.
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BP exchange rates. The resulting estimates imply very few expected transi-
tions.22 One might suspect that the small number of transitions might be an
artifact of the simplicity of the two random-walk setup. However, estimates
of transition probabilities obtained in studies with more general two-model
structures also imply very few transitions.23 In contrast to these studies, the
results in the preceding section suggest that the structural-change process
in the foreign exchange market entails many transitions (structural breaks)
between many diﬀerent models. This can seen in table 3, where most of
the estimates of the slope coeﬃcient are significantly diﬀerent from one (and
zero) and some of these estimates are positive, while others are negative.
One way to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between our structural-
change findings and those generated by the Engel and Hamilton model is
to argue that, despite the apparent variation among the estimates in table
3, our results are due to small sample biases of the estimates of the slope
parameter and/or its standard error and that, in fact, the underlying set of
diﬀerent models for the exchange rate is quite small, say two as in the Engel
and Hamilton model. Given the substantial magnitudes of the estimates of
the slope parameter in table 3, this would appear to be an unlikely explana-
tion. In any case, to explain away our results as due to small sample biases,
one would have to demonstrate that the estimated pattern of positive and
negative values of the slope parameter during diﬀerent subperiods presented
in table 3, is in fact consistent with a stationary process such as the Markov
switching between two (or some feasibly small number of) pre-specified sub-
models characterizing the exchange rate change in each “regime”.
But even if the two-state Markov switching model were found to be incon-
sistent with the observed structural change, the question would still remain
as to whether a model of switching between n (feasibly small, but greater
than two) number of models might characterize reasonably well the tempo-
ral instability of the exchange rate process. Such n-state Markov switching
models might result in estimates that imply a greater number of transitions
than in the Engel and Hamilton model. Since the literature does not contain
examples of an n-state Markov switching model, it is not known how well
22This is implied by the large estimated probabilities of remaining in each regime from
one period to the next, i.e. large diagonal elements of the transition matrix of the two-state
Markov switching model.
23Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) specify the two models of the exchange rate (and the
forward premium) as more general ARIMA processes and Evans and Lewis (1995) extend
the Engel and Hamilton switching model to allow for jumps in the exchange rate.
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such extensions will work. However, while the extended model might fit bet-
ter the structural change during some past period spanned by the sample,
the economist would need to specify sub-models (“regimes”) capturing the
impact of all future policy rules on the behavior of the exchange rate.
There is also another diﬃculty with the two-state (or n-state) Markov
switching model. This model assumes that after each transition to a “new”
policy regime, government policy either remains at the new regime or reverts
back to the “old” regime. It would seem natural to suppose that because each
future administration (or each successive year of the same administration)
is at least somewhat diﬀerent than those in the past, implying that as time
proceeds, government policy will “transit” to rules diﬀerent (in terms of
variables and/or values of parameters) than those characterizing policy in
the past. Thus, even if structural change is caused primarily by changes in
government policy, we would expect to find more than two diﬀerent models
are needed to characterize the behavior of exchange rates over three decades
of floating, and that the number of switches between models substantially
exceeds the number of transitions implied by the estimates of the two-state
Markov switching model.
Beyond its inherent problems as a model of structural change, the (two-
state) Markov switching model has provided little help in explaining the ex-
cess returns puzzle under the REH. After estimating the Markov switching
model, Engel and Hamilton (1990) conclude that “in the absence of a plau-
sible story about foreign exchange risk premia, we conclude that there are
long swings in the dollar and the markets do not know it (p.711, emphasis).”
Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) modify the Engel and Hamilton model to allow
for a richer class of ARIMA models of the exchange rate and the forward
premium. To reduce the small sample bias, Bekaert and Hodrick reestimate
the BF regression under the constraint that the exchange rate and the for-
ward premium follow the two-state Markov process. Their estimate of β
is still highly negative, which leads them to conclude: “After considering
alternative sources of bias, our conclusion is that the evidence against the
unbiasedness hypothesis using the rational expectations econometrics is very
strong (Bekaert and Hodrick (1993, p. 132).” Evans and Lewis (1995) extend
the Engel and Hamilton model to allow for jumps in the exchange rate and
introduce a risk premium into their REH-based econometric specification of
the exchange rate process. Using simulations of their switching process to
generate realizations of the exchange rate process, they re-estimate the BF
regression and argue that “some of the anomalous behavior [of foreign ex-
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change returns] can be explained by rational expectations about the shifts
between appreciating and depreciating processes (p. 734).”
Bekaert and Hodrick and Evans and Lewis carry out their analyses un-
der the assumption that the transition probabilities of the Markov switch-
ing model are constant. The study by Kaminsky (1993) suggests that such
probabilities are likely to be temporally unstable.24 In addition to assuming
Markov switching between two random-walk models of the exchange rate,
as in Engel and Hamilton (1990), Kaminsky introduces a two-state Markov
switching model governing the transition between two “informational states,”
dubbed “correct” or “wrong”. The two informational states arise from the
assumption that additional information is available to participants in the
foreign exchange market, such as Fed announcements, that provides either
the “correct” or “wrong” signal on the actual, but unobservable, regime.
Thus, in the Kaminsky extension of the Engel and Hamilton model, the es-
timation of the model involves two Markov-transition matrices (rather than
one). Kaminsky shows that an estimate of the probability of the Markov
model governing the transition between the two random walks depends on
the specification of the Markov process governing the transition between the
informational states. Moreover, the transition probabilities between infor-
mational states are temporally unstable: the values of these probabilities are
diﬀerent for the period when Burns and Miller were chairman of the Fed as
compared with the period of the Volker and Greenspan chairmanships.
In contrast to the REH-based approach to modeling structural change
and the bias of the forward rate, the IKE approach is predicated on the pre-
sumption that the temporal instability arising in the foreign exchange market
(and therefore the excess returns puzzle as modified in this paper) cannot
be explained by a pre-specified, overarching model of structural change. We
consider it unlikely that an overarching quantitative model could be found
to characterize economic change, even if it were to be confined to the tem-
porally unstable relationships in just one market (e.g., the foreign exchange
market) and even if the change was solely a consequence of changes in gov-
ernment policy rules, as in the REH framework.25 This scepticism results
24Kaminsky motivates her study by the observation that the Engel and Hamilton model
makes an unrealistic assumption that agents use only information contained in past ob-
servations of the exchange rate in estimating the current unobservable state of the process
and in forming their forecasts of the change in the exchange rate.
25We note that the characterization of government policy by a fixed rule is also likely
itself to involve parameter drift and large and discontinuous structural change, as policy
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from the fact that pre-specification of future government policy, both mon-
etary and fiscal, seems to require quantitative modeling of the behavior of
future and unknown policy oﬃcials. Nevertheless, these arguments do not
preclude the possibility that the REH approach may eventually be able to
deal with the kind of temporal instability that appears to be an inherent
feature of macroeconomic phenomena, particularly in the asset markets.
We also note that in addition to temporal instability in macroeconomet-
ric models arising from changes in government policy, the IKE framework
implies that temporal instability will also arise from the partly autonomous,
continuous and discontinuous, updating of agents’ expectations in a world of
imperfect knowledge.26 Thus in our world of imperfect knowledge, the po-
tential universe of future models has to remain open and structural change
procedures, such as the ones we used in the preceding section, should accom-
pany any empirical analysis of macroeconometric models, especially in asset
markets. In the next section, we show how such an open-ended approach to
the analysis of the time-series of the exchange rate and the forward premium
over the floating-rate period can provide an explanation of the excess returns
puzzle, as modified in this paper.
5 Towards a Resolution of the Excess-Returns
Puzzle
In this section we first outline our IKE-based model of the uncertainty pre-
mium.27 This model implies that persistent swings in the exchange rate both
oﬃcials update their necessarily imperfect views of the world. For evidence that some
popular “policy rules” are subject to temporal instability see for example, Frydman and
Rappoport (1987) and more recently Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000).
26The neglect of imperfect knowledge might be a more important problem in macroeco-
nomics than has been recognized. As Phelps put it in his recent reflections on the state
of macroeconomics
”What got lost in monetary macroeconomics amid its considerable
achievements in modeling imperfect information is the imperfect knowledge,
or uncertainty in the sense of Knight, that pervades the more entrepreneurial
of the market economies” (Phelps (2002))
27For a complete treatment of our model of the uncertainty premium see Frydman and
Godberg (2001, 2002, 2003a).
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away from and toward long-run benchmark levels will be associated with par-
ticular swings in expected excess returns. We then show how this implied
behavior of expected excess returns helps to explain not only the temporal
instability reported in tables 2 and 3 and figures 1 though 3, but also the
particular pattern of positive and negative biases reported in table 3 for the
major exchange rate swings of the 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s.
5.1 Imperfect Knowledge Expectations, Myopic Loss
Aversion and the Uncertainty Premium
Our model of the expected excess return on foreign exchange assumes imper-
fect knowledge expectations, heterogeneity of beliefs and myopic loss aver-
sion. With IKE and the assumption of individual rationality, expectation
functions will be temporally unstable, and as we showed in section 2 above,
this will lead to temporal instability in the relationship between the un-
certainty premium and the forward premium and, therefore, to temporal
instability of β in the BF regression. In addition to temporal instability,
we showed in Goldberg and Frydman (1996a) and Frydman and Goldberg
(2001,2002) that with IKE, otherwise standard models of the exchange rate
can generate long-swings in the exchange rate. This long swings result leads
us to develop a dynamic version of myopic loss aversion that accounts for
the evolution of agents’ assessments of losses during episodes of persistent
movements of the exchange rate from benchmark levels.
The assumption of myopic loss aversion due to Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) maintains that agents are more sensi-
tive to reductions than to increases in wealth, the level of wealth is of second
order of importance and agents monitor returns on their investments rela-
tively frequently. If we had assumed risk neutrality, agents’ decisions to buy
or sell foreign exchange would depend only on their assessments of expected
returns. But with myopic loss aversion, agents’ decisions to buy or sell foreign
exchange depend on their assessments of the expected utility of these deci-
sions. Moreover, since agents are more sensitive to losses than to gains, they
need to be compensated for this added sensitivity. Thus, both buyers and
sellers of foreign exchange demand a premium (over the risk-neutral return)
on taking open positions in the foreign exchange market.
Consider first the group of buyers of foreign exchange and let Eb(R)
denote this group’s expected one-period return on buying foreign exchange
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(i.e., Eb(R) = Eb(∆st+1) − fpt), where aggregation is accomplished using
wealth shares. If the foreign exchange market was populated by buyers only,
then the exchange rate would be bid to the point where the prospective or
expected utility of this return equaled zero. But because the utility functions
of buyers place greater weight on potential losses, a prospective return of zero
necessarily implies a positive excess return, Eb(R) > 0, i.e., buyers as a group
are unwilling to bid the exchange rate up to the risk-neutral point where the
expected yields on domestic- and foreign-currency positions are equal. As
such, with myopic loss aversion, uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) does not
hold and buyers of foreign exchange expect to earn a premium on their open
positions. Using the utility function of Benartzi and Thaler [1995], which
has become standard in the literature, we show in Frydman and Goldberg
(2001,2002, 2003a) that this expected (excess) return is a function of the
“expected loss” of buyers, Lb, and their degree of loss aversion, which is
captured by the parameter λ > 1, i.e., Eb(R) = (1− λ)Lb.28 It is important
to note that for buyers, losses from foreign currency speculation represent
negative realizations of R, so that Lb < 0 and Eb(R) > 0. We will refer to
this expected excess return as the uncertainty premium of buyers.
Analogously, let Es(R) and Ls denote the expected return and expected
loss of the group of sellers, respectively, giving Es(R) = (1− λ)Ls < 0.29
Note that for sellers of foreign exchange, losses represent positive realizations
of R, so that Ls > 0 and with λ > 1, Es(R) < 0. Again, if the market
contained only sellers, this group would be unwilling to bid the exchange
rate down to the point where UIP would hold. They therefore expect to earn
a premium on selling foreign exchange. We will refer to this expected excess
return as the uncertainty premium of sellers.
In the aggregate, the expected excess return on foreign exchange, which
we call the aggregate uncertainty premium and denote by U , is the summa-
tion of the uncertainty premia of the buyers and sellers, i.e., U = Eb(R) +
Es(R) = (1− λ) (Lb + Ls). Thus, positive values of U represent the premium
required by loss-averse buyers of foreign currency in excess of the premium
28The expected loss is defined as the average of potential losses based only on the
truncated loss part of the subjective distribution governing returns, so that Eb(R) =
Gb + Lb, where Gb denotes the expected gain. The literature has reported λ to be in
excess of 2. See Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and references therein.
29We also note that an agent will sometimes belong to the group of buyers and at other
times to the group of sellers. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the average λ
for both groups is the same.
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required by loss-averse sellers. One of the immediate implications of our
model of U is that if the weight of buyers of foreign exchange (sellers) is con-
sistently greater than that of sellers (buyers) during any subperiod, such that
Eb(R) is consistently greater than Es(R), we would expect such subperiods
to be characterized by rising (falling) values of foreign exchange (falling) and
a generally positive (negative) aggregate uncertainty premium. Hence, tran-
sitions from subperiods characterized by a generally rising (falling) exchange
rate to ones characterized by a generally falling (rising) exchange rate will
be associated with sign reversals in expected excess returns.30
In Frydman and Goldberg (2001,2002,2003a) we develop a dynamic model
for equilibrium movements in the aggregate uncertainty premium, U . This
entails specifying how Lb and Ls are connected to the evolution of exchange
rate expectations and the exchange rate during exchange rate swings. If
agents are aware of the tendency of floating exchange rates to exhibit long
swings, then they will view the gap in the exchange rate from long-run bench-
mark levels as an important factor in assessing the potential losses from cur-
rency speculation. We assume, therefore, that an increase in the gap between
the exchange rate and the perceived long-run benchmark level leads buyers
(sellers) to revise upwards (downwards) the absolute value of their assess-
ments of the potential losses. To see the intuition behind this assumption
assume the group of buyers and sellers believe that the value of foreign ex-
change is greater than the perceived benchmark level and that the value of
foreign exchange rises further. Since both buyers and sellers are aware of
the long-swings nature of the exchange rate, buyers become less confident
of a further movement away and sellers become more confident of a coun-
termovement. As such, buyers (sellers) revise upwards (downwards) their
assessments of the potential losses, i.e., −Lb rises and Ls falls, implying a
rise in U .
We show in Frydman and Goldberg (2001,2002,2003a) that this reasoning
leads to the following implication: the absolute value of U will rise (fall)
persistently during any subperiod characterized by a persistent swing in the
exchange rate away from (back to) the long-run benchmark level. In Frydman
and Goldberg [2001] we use survey data from MMS and provide preliminary
evidence that expected excess returns are indeed related to the gap from
30For the inability of standard models of the risk premium under the REH to match
up with the observed sign reversals in excess returns see Lewis (1995) and Mark and Wu
(1998).
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benchmark levels, as measured by PPP.31
5.2 Explaining the Modified Excess Returns Puzzle
We are now ready to use our IKE model of the uncertainty premium to shed
light on the temporal instability of the BF regression and the pattern of
positive and negative biases reported in table 3 for the major swings away
from PPP during the 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s. The swings away during the
1980’s, which involved persistently rising values of the U.S. dollar away from
PPP, implies that the weight of buyers of dollars (taken here to be the foreign
currency) consistently dominated during this subperiod. According to our
model, then, the aggregate excess returns on the dollar relative to the BP,
DM and JY should have been consistently positive during these swings, as
buyers required an uncertainty premium (in excess of the premium required
by sellers) to compensate them for the potential losses and uncertainty asso-
ciated with a countermovement back to PPP. Moreover, our model implies
that these positive excess returns on the dollar should have risen persistently
during these swings as the gaps from PPP widened and as buyers (sellers) of
dollars increased (decreased) their assessments of the potential losses. Similar
predictions hold for the swings away during the 1970’s and 1990’s, although
during these swings, sellers of dollars obviously dominated, implying that the
excess returns on dollars during these subperiods should have been negative
and trending down.
Figures 10 through 12 plot the ex post excess return (R) on the U.S.
dollar along with trend lines during all of the persistent swings away from
PPP examined in section 3. As predicted by our model, R is generally
negative and trending down during the exchange rate swings in the 1970’s
and 1990’s for all currencies and generally positive and trending up during
the exchange rate swings in the 1980’s for all currencies.
The extent to which the trending of excess returns in figures 10-12 im-
plies biases in forward-premium predictions depends on the behavior of the
forward premium during these swings. For each of these swings, if fp trends
persistently in one direction during some portion or all of the swing, then
this will lead to a non-zero correlation between the R and fp, generating a
31Canova (1991), Bekaert (1994) and Gokey (1994) all report evidence suggesting that
deviations from uncovered interest rate parity are related to deviations from PPP. Engel
(1996) argues, however, that the decompositions used in these papers preclude insight into
this problem.
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bias in forward-premium predictions during that portion of the exchange rate
swing involving a trending fp. Moreover, given that our model generates a
clear prediction concerning the sign and direction of change of R during each
of the swings away, our model also generates clear predictions concerning the
signs of the biases reported in table 3.
Consider first the DM swing away from PPP during the period from
1982:06 to1985:02. Our IKE-based model of the uncertainty premium pre-
dicts a negative correlation between U and fp and therefore a negative bias
during 1982:11-1984:06, since it predicts that the excess return on the dollar
should be trending up during the exchange rate swing and because fp hap-
pens to trend down during 1982:11-1984:06 as shown in figure 5. The same
logic implies negative biases of forward-premium predictions for the BP and
JY during the 1980’s swings, since during these swings, the exchange-rate
and forward-premium trends were in the same directions as for the DM. As
reported in table 3, these predictions of negative biases are borne out for all
three currencies, with estimates of the slope coeﬃcient that are all signifi-
cantly less than one and zero despite the small sample sizes. The fact that
all of the slope estimates are negative is not surprising because the contribu-
tion of exchange rate changes to ex post excess returns consistently dwarfs
the contribution of the forward premium over the period of floating rates,
implying that a trend in ex post excess returns implies a similar trend in the
change of the exchange rate.
In similar fashion, our theory predicts positive correlations between U and
fp and therefore positive biases during substantial portions of the swings in
the 1970’s and 1990’s for all currencies. This is because it predicts that the
excess return on the dollar should be trending down during these swings and
because fp also happens to trend down during substantial portions of these
time periods. As reported in table 3, these predictions of positive biases are
borne out for all currencies during the swings in both the 1970’s and 1990’s,
with estimates of the slope coeﬃcients which are all greater than one and
despite the small sample sizes, significantly so for four out of the five cases.
In addition to providing an explanation of the pattern of biases reported
in table 3, our IKE-based model of the uncertainty premium also provides
an explanation of the other key feature of the modified excess-returns puzzle:
the widespread temporal instability of the BF regression. Section 2 showed
that temporal instability in the relationship between exchange rate expec-
tations and fp would lead to instability in the correlation between U and
fp and thus, in the slope coeﬃcient in the BF regression. The assumption
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of individual rationality in a world of imperfect knowledge implies that ex-
pectation functions will be temporally unstable, suggesting that this channel
will be a major source of instability in the BF regression.
Most exchange rate theory posits a causal connection between relative
interest rates and the exchange rate. For example, the Dornbusch (1976)
and Frankel (1979) (DF) sticky-price monetary model implies that following a
one-time overshooting of PPP, the exchange rate movement back will involve
particular trends in both real and nominal exchange rates and interest rates.
Frankel [1985] and Dornbusch and Frankel [1988], among others, use this
logic to argue that the rise in the value of the U.S. dollar during the first
half of the 1980’s was due in large measure to the rise in U.S. long-term
real interest rates relative to the rest of the world that occurred during this
period. But as noted by these authors, it is diﬃcult to reconcile the DFmodel
with persistent movements of the exchange rate away from PPP. Referring
to the swings of the 1980’s, Dornbusch and Frankel remark that, “the dollar
overshot the overshooting equilibrium (Dornbusch and Frankel (1998), p.
17).” Without a theory of long swings it is diﬃcult to talk about exchange
rate movements.
We show in Goldberg and Frydman (1996a) and Frydman and Goldberg
(2002) that with IKE, the DF model not only generates long swings, but that
a persistent rise in the exchange rate away from PPP may be associated with
a rising or falling nominal interest rate diﬀerential, depending in part on the
weights agents attach to the set of fundamental variables in forming expec-
tations.32 When rational agents coping with imperfect knowledge inevitably
update their expectations functions, any relationship between nominal ex-
change rates and nominal interest rates that may have existed over some
subperiod may either disappear or even switch sign.
As suggested by the time plots of excess returns in figures 10 through 12
and of the forward premium in figures 5, 8 and 9, such instability seems to be
an integral part of the behavior in the foreign exchange market. Consider the
exchange rate swings of the 1980’s. For all three currencies, the swings away
from PPP began by mid 1982 (1982:06 for the BP, 1982:06 for the DM and
1981:02 for the JY) and continued until the beginning of 1985. Inspection of
figures 5, 8 and 9 reveals that for all three currencies the downward trends
32The DF model with IKE does imply a stable long-run relationship between swings in
the real exchange rate and swings in the real interest rate diﬀerential. This implication of
IKE is used in Frydman, Goldberg and Juselius (2003) to explain the PPP puzzle.
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in fp set in only after the exchange rate swings began and reversed direction
in mid 1984, well before the exchange rate swings also reversed direction.
Given this behavior on the part of fp and given that our IKE-based model
of the uncertainty premium implies an upward trending U throughout the
exchange rate swings away, our model implies that the correlation between
U and fp should be unstable over the full subperiods involving the swings.
This logic leads to two predictions. First, the BF regression should expe-
rience a structural break in 1984:07 for all three currencies As we reported
in table 3, this is indeed the case at p-values lower than .001 for all three
currencies. Second, the biases reported in table 3 should all fall and perhaps
lose their significance if the BF regression were run over the full subperiods
involving the swings. Table 5 reports the results of such regressions. In
each case, the slope estimates become much less negative (for the BP, the
slope coeﬃcient becomes positive and for the DM and JY the slope increases
from -19.8 to -6.61 and from -22.29 to -4.31, respectively!) and all estimates
become insignificantly diﬀerent from one or zero. In contrast to earlier stud-
ies suggesting that the 1980’s are characterized by negative biases, the null
hypothesis of unbiasedness cannot be rejected over these subperiods in the
1980’s.
Inspection of the time plots of excess returns and the forward premium
for the swings in the 1970’s and 1990’s, as well as the evidence of tempo-
ral instability reported in table 3, suggests that similar logic and behavior
is at work during these other subperiods of exchange rate swings. Hence,
taken as a whole, our empirical findings lead to the following conclusion:
the temporal instability of expectation functions, through its impact on the
correlation between the uncertainty premium and the forward premium, pro-
vides a reasonable explanation of the observed temporal instability of the BF
regression.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has used a new model of the risk premium under imperfect knowl-
edge expectations, called an uncertainty premium, to explain the modified
excess-returns puzzle, i.e., the observation that the predictions of the for-
ward premium are sometimes negatively biased, positively biased, unbiased
or possess no predictive content, depending on the subperiod examined. It is
important to re-emphasize that the observed pattern of positive and negative
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values of the slope coeﬃcient may also be due to the transient correlation be-
tween the forecast errors and the forward premium. Hence, one of the issues
that remains to be examined is the question of the relative contributions of
the uncertainty premium and forecast errors in explaining the excess returns
puzzle, as modified in this paper.
The inability of REH-based models of the risk premium and structural
change to explain the findings of the BF regression has led to a troublesome
suggestion that economic agents are grossly irrational. Our IKE-based model
of structural change and the uncertainty premium holds out the promise that
the foreign exchange market may be informationally eﬃcient after all. It
seems to us, therefore, that macroeconomists face a choice: either they can
continue trying to explain asset market anomalies using the REH and live
with the specter of gross irrationality in asset markets or they can recognize
that imperfect knowledge, which is an inherent feature of the environment in
which agents have to form expectations, may be the key to reconciling the
movement of asset prices with the postulate of individual rationality.
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Table 1a 
The BF Regression 
 
  
αˆ  
 
βˆ  
 
R2 
1973:5- 
1996:12 
-.540 
(.24) 
-1.54*** 
(.68) 
.016  
 
BP 
 
1975:1- 
1996:12 
-.497 
(.25) 
-1.51*** 
(.77) 
.014 
1973:5- 
1996:12 
-.256 
(.23) 
-.52* 
(.85) 
.002  
 
DM 1975:1- 
1996:12 
.238 
(.24) 
-.62* 
(.88) 
.003 
-.271 
(.20) 
.035 
(1.16) 
.000  
1973:5- 
1996:12 - .42 
(1.05) 
 
 
Yen 
1975:1- 
1996:12 
-.687 
(.21) 
-3.97*** 
(1.60) 
.025 
 
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). Bold numbers for βˆ  indicate 
significance from one, with three stars denoting significance at the one percent level, two stars at the five percent level, one star 
at the ten percent level and no stars at the fifteen percent level. Numbers in italics denote insignificance from one. 
Table 2a 
The Structural Instability of the BF Regression 
 
 αˆ  βˆ  R2  Structural Change Testb  
-.170 
(.539) 
-.04 
(1.12) 
.000 
 
190.63 
(.00) 
 
1973:5-1979:12 
(80:1-89:12)c - .25 
(.65) 
-  
1980:1-1989:12 
(90:01-96:12) 
-.908 
(.323) 
-4.49*** 
(1.114) 
.106 92.721 
(.24) 
  1980:1-1984:12 
(85:01-89:12) 
-1.135 
(.369) 
-2.60*** 
(1.16) 
.056 113.7 
(.00) 
  1985:1-1989:12 
(90:01-94:12) 
-2.067 
(1.363) 
-9.01** 
(4.34) 
.076 80.34 
(.04) 
.28 
(.416) 
1.20 
(1.86) 
.006  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BP 
   
1990:1-1996:12 
 - .59 
(1.36) 
-  
-.340 
(.577) 
.85 
(2.02) 
.003 174.33 
(.00) 
   
1973:5-1979:12 
   (80:01-89:12) - 1.67 
(1.23) 
-  
  1980:1-1989:12 
(90:01-96:12) 
-1.794 
(.886) 
-5.57** 
(2.81) 
.062 (122.32 
(.00) 
  1980:1-1984:12 
(85:01-89:12) 
.232 
(1.234) 
-1.913 
(3.43) 
.012 99.61 
(.00) 
1985:1-1989:12 
(90:01-96:12) 
-3.516 
(1.220) 
-10.43** 
(4.96) 
.051 240.77 
(.00) 
-.057 
(.355) 
.16 
(1.52) 
.000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DM 
   
1990:1-1996:12 
- .06 
(1.46) 
-  
-.054 
(.326) 
1.63 
(1.09) 
.033 177.6 
(.00) 
  
1973:5-1979:12 
(80:01-89:12) - 1.65 
(1.11) 
-  
 1980:1-1989:12 
(90:01-96:12) 
-1.305 
(.496) 
-6.41** 
(2.95) 
.047 67.57 
(.90) 
 1980:1-1984:12 
  (85:01-89:12) 
-.629 
(.705) 
-3.98 
(3.35) 
.031 49.13 
(.07) 
 1984:1-1989:12 
  (90:01-92:12) 
-2.344 
(.730) 
-16.33*** 
(5.85) 
.085 52.23 
(.04) 
-.277 
(.331) 
-7.16** 
(3.77) 
.043  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yen 
  
1990:01-1996:12 
- -6.83** 
(3.80) 
-  
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). Bold numbers for βˆ  indicate 
significance from one, with three stars denoting significance at the one percent level, two stars at the five percent level, one star 
at the ten percent level and no stars at the fifteen percent level. Numbers in italics denote insignificance from one. 
bForecast chi square test due to Hendry (1980).  Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
c The parentheses shows the forecast period. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3a 
The BF Regression 
Major Swings Away from PPP 
 
 
       αˆ        βˆ         R2  Structural 
Change Testb  
1975:06-1976:10       
(79:12) 
- 3.59** 
(1.09) 
- 85.90 
(.000) 
 
 
BP 1983:03-1984:06 
(79:12) 
-.10 
(.96) 
-13.02** 
(6.65) 
.191 183.12 
(.000) 
1976:12-1978:10 
(79:12) 
- 5.13** 
(2.01) 
.128 49.3 
(.000) 
1982:11-1984:06 
(89:12) 
-6.42 
(2.64) 
-19.80*** 
(6.37) 
.239 123.04 
(.000) 
 
 
DM 
1993:09-1995:04 
(96:12) 
-1.45 
(.78) 
6.91 
(3.91) 
.168 65.42 
(.000) 
1977:05-1978:10 
(79:12) 
- 
 
12.46** 
(4.77) 
- 61.56 
(.000) 
1983:01-1984:06 
(89:12) 
-2.53 
.95 
-22.29*** 
(6.06) 
.226 258.70 
(.000) 
 
 
JY 
1991:04-1995:04 
(96:12) 
-1.20 
(.51) 
7.25 
(7.15) 
.035 61.46 
(.000) 
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). Bold numbers for βˆ  indicate 
significance from one, with three stars denoting significance at the one percent level, two stars at the five percent level, one star 
at the ten percent level and no stars at the fifteen percent level. Numbers in italics denote insignificance from one. 
bForecast chi square test due to Hendry (1980).  Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 
Table 4a 
BF Regression 
Other Subsamples: 1970’s and 1990’s 
 αˆ  βˆ  R2 
1973:05-1975:05 -1.78 
(.61) 
-2.68*** 
(1.08) 
.123 
1976:10-1979:12 - -2.19*** 
(.59) 
- 
.28 
(.416) 
1.20 
(1.86) 
.006 
 
 
 
 
 
BP 
   
1990:1-1996:12 
 - .59 
(1.36) 
- 
-.16 
(.72) 
.99 
(3.37) 
.003  
1973:05-1976:11 
- 1.44 
(2.38) 
- 
-5.17 
(4.56) 
-9.93 
(9.92) 
.071  
1978:11-1979:12 
- .09 
(1.78) 
- 
-.57 
(.74) 
1.66 
(2.43) 
.008  
1990:01-1993:08 
- .33 
(1.71) 
- 
-1.13 
(5.02) 
-11.66 
(29.92) 
.013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DM 
 
1995:05-1996:12 
- -4.72 
(3.47) 
- 
-.06 
(.28) 
2.28 
(1.06) 
.197  
1973:05-1977:04 
 - 2.25 
(1.01) 
 
-.73 
(.3.29) 
-9.99 
(12.76) 
.041  
1978:11-1979:12 
- -7.54** 
(3.81 
 
-.17 
(1.13) 
-5.55 
(13.65) 
.009  
1990:01-1991:03 
 - -6.70 
(11.66) 
- 
 
 
 
 
JY 
1995:05-1996:12 - -14.71*** 
(4.94) 
- 
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). Bold numbers for βˆ  indicate 
significance from one, with three stars denoting significance at the one percent level, two stars at the five percent level, one star 
at the ten percent level and no stars at the fifteen percent level. Numbers in italics denote insignificance from one. 
 
Table 5a 
The BF Regression 
The Swings of the 1980’s 
 αˆ  βˆ  R2 
BP 1982:06-1985:02 -1.49 
(.48) 
.08 
(3.24) 
.000 
DM 1982:06-1985:02 -1.40 
(2.22) 
-6.61 
(5.60) 
.055 
JY 1981:05-1985:02 -.32 
(.96) 
-3.42 
(4.91) 
.016 
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980). Bold numbers 
for βˆ  indicate significance from one, with three stars denoting significance at the one percent level, two stars at 
the five percent level, one star at the ten percent level and no stars at the fifteen percent level. Numbers in italics 
denote insignificance from one. 
 
Figure 1
One-Step Chow Test
BP
0
1
2
3
4
5
1974
1975
1977
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
1992
1993
1994
1995
Figure 2
One-Step Chow Test
DM
0
1
2
3
4
5
1974
1975
1977
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
1992
1993
1994
1995
Figure 3
One-Step Chow Test
JY
0
1
2
3
4
5
1974
1975
1977
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
1992
1993
1994
1995
Figure 5
DM Forward Premium
(a)
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Nov-75
Apr-76
Sep-76
Feb-77
Jul-77
Dec-77
May-78
1976:12
Figure 4
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
May-73
May-75
May-77
May-79
May-81
May-83
May-85
May-87
May-89
May-91
May-93
May-95
DM/$
PPP
Figure 5
(b)
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
Ju
n-
82
Ju
l-8
2
Au
g-
82
Se
p-
82
O
ct
-8
2
N
ov
-8
2
D
ec
-8
2
Ja
n-
83
Fe
b-
83
M
ar
-8
3
Ap
r-8
3
M
ay
-8
3
Ju
n-
83
Ju
l-8
3
Au
g-
83
Se
p-
83
O
ct
-8
3
N
ov
-8
3
D
ec
-8
3
Ja
n-
84
Fe
b-
84
M
ar
-8
4
Ap
r-8
4
M
ay
-8
4
Ju
n-
84
Ju
l-8
4
Au
g-
84
Se
p-
84
O
ct
-8
4
N
ov
-8
4
D
ec
-8
4
Ja
n-
85
1982:11
1984:06
Figure 5
(c)
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Sep-93
Dec-93
Mar-94
Jun-94
Sep-94
Dec-94
Mar-95
Figure 6
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
May-73
May-75
May-77
May-79
May-81
May-83
May-85
May-87
May-89
May-91
May-93
May-95
BP/$
PPP
Figure 7
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
May-73
May-74
May-75
May-76
May-77
May-78
May-79
May-80
May-81
May-82
May-83
May-84
May-85
May-86
May-87
May-88
May-89
May-90
May-91
May-92
May-93
May-94
May-95
May-96
JY/$
PPP
Figure 8
BP Forward Premium
(a)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Feb-75
May-75
Aug-75
Nov-75
Feb-76
May-76
Aug-76
1976:06
Figure 8
(b)
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Jun-82
Oct-82
Feb-83
Jun-83
Oct-83
Feb-84
Jun-84
Oct-84
1983:03
1984:06
Figure 9
JY Forward Premium
(a)
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
May-77
Jul-77
Sep-77
Nov-77
Jan-78
Mar-78
May-78
Jul-78
Sep-78
Figure 9
(b)
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Feb-81
Jun-81
Oct-81
Feb-82
Jun-82
Oct-82
Feb-83
Jun-83
Oct-83
Feb-84
Jun-84
Oct-84
1983:01
1984:06
Figure 9
(c)
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Apr-90
Sep-90
Feb-91
Jul-91
Dec-91
May-92
Oct-92
Mar-93
Aug-93
Jan-94
Jun-94
Nov-94
1991:04
Figure 10
Excess Return BP/$
(a)
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Feb-75
May-75
Aug-75
Nov-75
Feb-76
May-76
Aug-76
Figure 10
(b)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Jun-82
Oct-82
Feb-83
Jun-83
Oct-83
Feb-84
Jun-84
Oct-84
Figure 11
Excess Return: DM/$
(a)
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Nov-75
Mar-76
Jul-76
Nov-76
Mar-77
Jul-77
Nov-77
Mar-78
Jul-78
Figure 11
(b)
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Jun-82
Oct-82
Feb-83
Jun-83
Oct-83
Feb-84
Jun-84
Oct-84
Figure 11
(c)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Sep-93
Dec-93
Mar-94
Jun-94
Sep-94
Dec-94
Figure 12
(b)
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Jan-83
Apr-83
Jul-83
Oct-83
Jan-84
Apr-84
Figure 12
Excess Returns: JY/$
(a)
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
May-77
Jul-77
Sep-77
Nov-77
Jan-78
Mar-78
May-78
Jul-78
Sep-78
Figure 12
(c)
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Feb-91
Jul-91
Dec-91
May-92
Oct-92
Mar-93
Aug-93
Jan-94
Jun-94
Nov-94
